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not designed to disqualify such plaintiffs. There was no cause of action at the
time of the plaintiff's purchases. It is impossible to perceive how the public
policy against strike suits could be offended by permitting derivative suits
under these circumstances.
RIGHT OF MINOR CHILD TO SUE PARENTS FOR SUPPORT
The petitioner, an only child, had been placed in her mother's custody by an
Indiana court which granted a divorce to her mother, but, because of the
father's being outside of Indiana, did not enter an order requiring him to sup-
port his child. A petition in equity was filed in the circuit court of DuPage
County, Illinois, on behalf of the minor child, by her mother as next friend, to
compel the father to contribute to her support, but was dismissed on the ground
that no cause of action was stated, and that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter. The appellate court, reversing, stated that they would not al-
low the father to escape his legal obligation to support his child by absenting
himself from the jurisdiction of the court which granted the divorce, and held
that a minor whose parents were divorced in another state could maintain a
petition for support in a court of equity in Illinois where the father was domi-
ciled. Parker v. Parker.x
It is not surprising that in many respects a husband's duty to support his
wife and a father's duty to support his child are enforced by similar proceedings,
for both relationships arise from the establishment of a family unit. However,
in the absence of legislation, the courts have experienced greater difficulty in
adequately enforcing the father's than they have in enforcing the husband's
duty.
The common law recognized that the husband was under a legal obligation
to support his wife, but because of her incapacity to sue, that duty was only en-
forceable indirectly. Thus, if the husband and wife were separated, and the
wife had not forfeited her right to support by her own wrongful acts, a third
party who had provided her with necessaries could recover from the husband
under the theory that the wife was the husband's agent.2 "Necessaries" here
meant items which were essential to the wife's health and comfort, and com-
mensurate with the husband's income.3
the Delaware Court in the principal case joined the New York courts in their interpretation
of the similar New York statute. N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law (McKinney, Supp., 1948) § 6i; cf.
Myer v. Myer, 187 N.Y. Misc. 769, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 540 (1946); Coane v. American Distilling
Co., 182 N.Y. Misc. 926,49 N.Y.S. 2d 838 (1944).
'335 Ill. App. 293, 8x N.E. 2d 745 (1948)-
2Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations igo (193 1). This agency was implied as a matter
of law.
3 Jordan -arsh Co. v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N.E. 350 (1922); Raymond v. Cowdrey,
19 N.Y. Misc. 34,42 N.Y. Supp. 557 (i896).
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A husband who neglected or abandoned his wife was not subject to criminal
prosecution at common law, but statutes patterned on the English statute of
43 Eliz. c. 2 (i6oi) in practically all of the states now make the husband crimi-
inally liable for desertion or nonsupport of his wife.4 By means of the sus-
pended sentence or parole, the threat of punishment may be used to induce a
defaulting husband to support his wife, but these statutes were designed only
to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge and do not generally compel
the husband to provide support according to his wife's position and his ability
to pay. They only afford a quick remedy to supplement the more slowly ob-
tained but more complete separate maintenance or alimony remedy which is
usually available to the wife.s
Relief agencies in all of the states provide maintenance for poor persons, and
in addition, in most jurisdictions, "poor laws" make the relatives of poor per-
sons liable for their support. Here again, however, the level of support which is
to be provided is only that necessary to prevent the pauper from becoming a
public charge.6
That the standard of relief provided by these statutes, and the difficulties at-
tendant to the procurement of necessaries from a third person made the wife's
remedy grossly inadequate was even more apparent when viewed in the light
of the level of support which the courts decreed as alimony in divorce actions,
or which is available to the wife under separate maintenance statutes.7 From
earliest times, when a divorce a m sa et thoro was granted, courts decreed ali-
mony, not at the subsistence level, but in accordance with the husband's abil-
ity to pay, usually awarding approximately one-third of the husband's income.8
In the United States, all jurisdictions which permit divorce provide some
method for enforcing the husband's continuing duty to support his wife,9
usually by an allowance of alimony which is to be "just" or "suitable" or "equi-
table."1° In addition, statutes in most states permit the wife to bring civil pro-
ceedings to enforce this duty although there is no divorce, when the husband
4 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § x62 (I935).
s "The statutes provide an additional and quick remedy... to punish the guilty husband
for his offense and at the same time prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. They
give no civil remedy." Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 398, 14 S.E. 2d 317, 321 (i941). In approv-
ing of the above language, the court in McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, x8o Va. 51, 67, 21
S.E. 2d 761, 768 (1942), went on to say, "What is said there in regard to a deserted wife is
most apposite when applied to the case at bar. The principle involved is the same. Neither
in law nor in morals should a distinction be drawn between the right appertaining to a deserted
wife and the right appertaining to a neglected child."
6 For a discussion of Poor Law provisions and Relief Agency activities in the United States
consult Clarke, Social Legislation 445-557 (1940); 4 Vernier, American Family Laws § 234
(1935).
7 Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations 330 (193x).
$Ibid., at 320, 322; 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § o7 (935).
9 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § ioS (1935).
'0 Ibid., § x07.
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has neglected to support her, or when any cause for divorce exists,, These ali-
mony and separate maintenance statutes, as enforced by ordinary equity rem-
edies and by many special statutes, 2 thus assure to the wife support at a level
consonant with her station and with her husband's ability to pay, the criminal
statutes, poor laws, and implied agency remedies being used only when the
more complete remedy is impracticable or is not available.
It would seem that the best interests of society would require enforcement
of the father's obligation to support his children to the same extent that it re-
quires enforcement of his obligation to support his wife, but effective recognition
of the duty owed to the child has always lagged behind the enforcement of the
duty owed to the wife. At common law in England it was well settled that the
father's duty to support his child was legally unenforceable because it was only
a moral obligation, .3 and therefore neither the child nor a third person who had
furnished necessaries for the support of the child had any action against the
father.,! This rule was too harsh to earn wide acceptance in the United States,15
and to provide some legal remedy for securing the child's support, the courts
resorted to the fiction that "the moral obligation of the father to support his in-
fant child is sufficient to raise an implied promise to pay for necessaries fur-
nished to the child by a stranger.' 6 This remedy is inadequate, for under it the
child is not guaranteed any support in advance but must persuade tradesmen,
physicians, or others to provide him with necessaries despite the fact that their
recovery from the father may depend on future litigation. To recover, the
tradesman must show that the articles provided were in fact "necessaries," and
the courts, in their desire to prevent meddlers from interfering with the father's
right to determine what support shall be furnished his child, have given this
word a stricter meaning than they do when it is used in connection with the
wife's agency of necessity.17 In addition, if the father is furnishing some reason-
able support, the tradesman cannot recover, for then there is no breach of his
obligation to support.48
The limited availability of this enforcement procedure was further restricted
by some early cases which held that since the father's duty to support his child
and his right to the child's custody and services were reciprocal, when he had
11 Ibid., § 139. 2 Ibid., § zog.
x3 Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations 383 (1931); Peck, Domestic Relations 361
(3d ed., 1930); 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 56 (1935).
14Mortimore v. Wright, 6 Mees. & W. 48r (Exch., 1846); Seaborne v. Maddy, 9 Car. & P.
497 (i84o); Urmston v. Newcomen, 4 Ad. & Ell. 899 ('843); Baceley v. Forder, L.R. 3 Q.B.
559 (1867)-
15 Peck, Domestic Relations 363 (3d ed., 1930).
'
6 Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (189i).
"7 Compare Rapoport v. Hussey, 145 Tenn. 583, 267 S.W. 68 (1924), and Cheever v. Kelly,
96 Kan. 269, zio Pac. 529 (1915), with text cited note 3 supra.
S4 Vernier, American Family Laws 56 (1935); Peck, Domestic Relations 363 (3d ed.,
X930).
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been deprived of the right, he was relieved of the obligation.9 An exception to
the rule was generally recognized when the father forfeited his right to the
child's custody and services because of his own wrongdoing."' In the later cases
it was at least openly stated that the father's obligation to support his children
springs simply from the nature of the parental relation, and that this duty con-
tinued in the absence of the right to custody and services.2 This theory is ac-
cepted by the principal case which states that "[tihis obligation of the father to
support his minor child is not affected by the decree granting a divorce, nor by
the decree granting the care and custody of his child to his wife or some other
suitable person. His children are of his blood. It is not their fault that their par-
ents have been divorced. It is their right to be given care by those who brought
them into the world until they are old enough to take care of themselves."-
In all American jurisdictions, by statute, the father's failure to support his
minor child is punishable as a crime.23 While the threat of criminal punishment
may prevent the child from becoming a public charge, support consonant with
the father's ability to pay and with the child's station in life is not generally con-
templated by these statutes. Poor laws which permit relief agencies or the pau-
per to maintain an action against the parent for support are also generally avail-
able, but they suffer from the same subsistence-level-of-support inadequacy.'4
The limited support afforded the child by the common law, poor laws, and
criminal statutes, resulting from the reluctance of courts and legislatures to in-
terfere with the parental prerogative in this area, restricts the utility of these
remedies. When the family unit has been destroyed and the father does not
have custody of the child, such reluctance is inappropriate, as it only enables
the father to escape his continuing duty to provide support, to the injury of the
innocent child. Therefore, when pursuant to a divorce the mother is given cus-
tody of the child, the father's obligation is usually enforced by including as an
item of the mother's alimony a sum sufficient to maintain the child according to
his station in life, limited only by the father's ability to pay. In almost all states
which grant absolute or limited divorces, statutes provide that the court which
grants the divorce shall have full discretion as to the amount of support which
shall be decreed as long as the amount is right, just, proper, reasonable, expedi-
ent, etc.' S In addition, most states have statutes dealing with the custody and
'9 Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations 389 (19p); Peck, Domestic Relations 365
(3 d ed., i93o).
20 Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations 386 (193i).
2, Liebold v. Liebold, i58 Ind. 6o, 62 N.E. 627 (1902).
2 Parker v. Parker, 335 Ill. App. 293, 8i N.E. 2d 745 (1948), quoting from Kelley v. Kelley,
317 Ill. 104, 110, 147 N.E. 659, 66r (1925).
"3 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 6o (r935).
24 Texts cited note 6 supra.
2S 2 Vernier, American Family Laws §§ 95, 131 (1935).
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maintenance of children of separated parents which describe, in similar terms,
the support which the court in its discretion may provide for the child .2
In the light of the ample protection afforded the child by these statutes, it
seems strange that no comparable protection is provided when the father neg-
lects to support his child and statutory protection is not directly available.
Thus, where, as in the principal case, the court which granted the divorce can-
not compel the father to support his child because the father is not within its
jurisdiction, or where the parents have been living apart and the mother who
has been supporting the child dies, the child cannot usually maintain an action
against the father for support 7 and is therefore limited to the protection pro-
vided by the poor laws, criminal statutes, and implied contract remedy. One
reason the courts have frequently given for this result is that, since the legis-
lature has provided for methods for the enforcement of the father's obligation
in the most common or most compelling situations (e.g., a divorce proceeding
when both parents are within the court's jurisdiction, poverty, and willful
neglect of the child), they are therefore not justified in going beyond these stat-
utes by providing another remedy for the breach of this duty in the uncommon
situation where the statutory remedy is incomplete or unavailable.2 The con-
tention that providing a method for enforcing this duty is a matter for the
legislature, while based on the sound dogma that the courts should not usurp a
legislative function, ignores the considerations on which that rule is based by
abrogating the legislative policy underlying the existing remedial statutes. A
court of equity may properly provide for the enforcement of such a well-recog-
nized right when the child would be remediless simply because a form to fit his
circumstances is not provided by statute.?9
Another reason frequently given by the courts is that a child should not be
allowed to sue his father for support because such actions would disrupt the
peace and repose of families and of society and would let a contentious child
threaten his father with a suit to test the sufficiency of the support which was
being provided.3° It is the father's prerogative to determine the level of the
26 Tbid., § 142. See Turrentine, The Trial Judge Decrees Maintenance, io Law & Contemp.
Prob. 747 (x944); Whitmore, Maintenance on Appeal, io Law & Contemp. Prob. 757 (1944).
27 See cases cited mote 3o infra.
28Sikes v. Sikes, 158 Ga. 406, 123 S.E. 694 (1924). "...[T]he only provisions for com-
pelling future support of a child ... are contained in the Domestic Relations Court Act."
Schacht v. Schacht, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 54, 61 (1945). "While we have no doubt of the power of
the legislature to so amend our statutes as to empower the courts to decree and compel the
payment of allowances for the support of dependent minors as against a parent,... in-
dependent of divorce proceedings, yet we are compelled under the existing statutes to deny
such relief, when not sought in a divorce suit.. . ." Cunningham v. Cunningham, X2o Tex.
497,503, 4o S.W. 2d 46, 51 (1931).
29 Some courts have recognized that the statutory remedies are not exclusive. McClaugherty
v. McClaugherty, z8o Va. 51, 21 S.E. 2d 761 (1942); Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20
S.E. 2d 237 (1942).
3' Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. i4o, 83 So. 146 (i9g9); Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss.
703, 9 So. 885 (i89i); Worthington v. Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216, 253 S.W. 443 (1923);
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child's support as a necessary incident of his right to educate the child according
to his wishes. Unfortunately, many courts have applied these doctrines without
paying attention to the facts of a particular case, and without regard for the
best interests of the child."1 If the father has shown that he is an unfit person to
control his child's support and education, and has neglected the child, he is al-
lowed to profit by his own wrong if no action to compel him to provide support
beyond that contemplated by the poor laws is permitted. The same manifest in-
justice exists when the father is not within the jurisdiction of the court which
grants his divorce, for it is thereby prevented from entering an order for the sup-
port of the child. Here the repose of the family has already been destroyed, and
when the mother has the custody of the child and the attendant right to deter-
mine its proper level of support, there is no policy reason why the child's right
to the maximum standard of support should be abrogated.'
A few states have statutes which fix the support which the parent must pro-
vide for the child as that suitable to his circumstances, a standard similar to that
granted to the wife by alimony and separate maintenance statutes.33 However,
in contrast to the detailed enforcement procedures available to the wife, no
method for the enforcement of these statutory rights is expressly provided. The
reluctance of the courts to allow the child to maintain a civil action against his
parents for support would probably restrict enforcement to actions by third
parties, which might limit the effect of these statutes merely to a broadening of
the definition of "necessaries" in the common-law implied contract remedy.
More recently courts have held that, since the primary liability of the father
for the support of his child continues even after the father has been deprived of
its custody, equity will not allow him to escape that obligation.34 If the father
is not providing support consistent with his ability to pay and with the child's
station in life, these courts hold that equity will create a remedy and permit the
child to sue his father by his next friend for that support if no other complete
remedy is available.35 The father cannot limit his liability for support by a con-
McKelvey v. McKelvey i ri Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (r9o3); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va.
458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938).
3, See cases cited note 30 supra.
31 The inapplicability of this policy where the family is already broken because of divorce
has been recognized by some of the courts which have allowed the child to maintain an action
for support against his father. Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 20 S.E. 2d 237 (1942);
Simonds v. Simonds, 154 F. 2d 326 (App. D.C., 1946); Green v. Green, 21o N.C. 147, 185 S.E.
651 (1936).
33 4 Vernier, American Family Laws 58 (I935).
'4 Kemp v. Kemp, 332 Ill. App. 432, 75 N.E. 2d 385 (1947); Johnson v. Johnson, 239 Ill.
App. 417 (1926); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938); Pickelsimer v.
Critcher, 21o N.C. 779, i88, S.E. 313 (1936).
35 Schneider v. Schneider, x41 F. 2d 542, 544 (App. D.C., z944) . The court stated that
although ". . . [slome decisions in other jurisdictions give the child no rights to enforce the
duty of support... these cases are contrary to the established principle that where a duty
exists, equity will provide a remedy for its violation." McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, i8o
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tract with the mother, for, although such a contract may be binding on the
parties, it will not be allowed to conclude the child's rights.36 Nor can the
father limit his liability for supporting his child by personally appearing in the
court of a foreign jurisdiction which grants his divorce, and which decrees an
amount for the support of the child. The child's rights are determined by the
law of the family's domicil, and the court of that domicil will entertain a suit
on behalf of the child by his next friend in order to determine for itself the prop-
er amount to be given for the support of the child.37 These courts recognize the
inapplicability of the policy notions ruthlessly applied by the older cases, and
refuse to sacrifice the welfare of the child to uphold an abused parental privilege.
In refusing to follow the only other Illinois case which presented the ques-
tion of the right of a child to sue his father for support,38 the court in the princi-
pal case seems to have been moved by the palpable injustice of enabling the
father to escape his legal obligation by simply staying out of the jurisdiction of
the court which granted the divorce. The decision is placed largely on the ground
that equity which has plenary jurisdiction over infants will be moved by this
injustice and will not permit the child to go remediless simply because no other
enforcement procedure is available. The court's decision establishes the pro-
cedure necessary to full enforcement of the child's right in the absence of ade-
quate traditional remedies by indicating that the father's liability for the sup-
port of his child is not reciprocal to his right to the custody and services of the
child, but is founded in the mere fact of parentage, and by making the measure
of his liability his ability to pay and the child's station in life. In effect it gives
the child a right analogous to the wife's action for separate maintenance, thus
rightly providing a member of the family whose position is similar to that of the
wife with protection akin to that given to the wife. 39
Va. 51, 21 S.E. 2d 761 (1942); Campbell v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 73, 20 S.E. 2d 237, 239
(1942), where the court said, "This in our opinion is the only effectual remedy to insure [the
children's] support. To so hold does not in any way conflict with the public policy of this
State."
36 Commonwealth ex rel. Rossi v. Rossi, ix6 Pa. Super. 86, 53 A. 2d 887 (1947). This is also
the rule in jurisdictions which do not allow the child to maintain an action against his father
by his next friend. In these jurisdictions the child's success in recovering an amount in excess
of that contemplated by the contract depends upon the methods for enforcing his father's
obligations that are open to him. Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 19o Ati. 753 (1937); Worthington
v. Worthington, 212 Mo. App. 216 (1923).
37 Schneider v. Schneider, x41 F. 2d 542 (App. D.C., 1944).
31 Hawkins v. Hawkins, 288 Ill. App. 623, 6 N.E. 2d 509 (1937).
39 "What is said.., in regard to a deserted wife is most apposite when applied to the case
at bar. The principle involved is the same. Neither in law nor in morals, should a distinction
be drawn between the right appertaining to a... wife and the right appertaining to a neglected
child." McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, iSo Va. 5i, 67, 21 S.E. 2d 761, 768 (1942); Buchanan
v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 197 S.E. 426 (1938).
